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HOW CONTENT MODERATION MAY  
EXPOSE SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES TO 
GREATER DEFAMATION LIABILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 25, 2018, Vice News published an online article discussing 
allegations from various Twitter users that Twitter was “shadow-banning.”1 
The users accused Twitter of secretly removing or hiding the accounts of 
several prominent, politically conservative users of the platform.2 Twitter 
has chalked up the perceived shadow-banning to an algorithmic error,3 but 
these allegations and others like them have led to broader conversations 
about content moderation on some of the world’s largest social media 
platforms. Since Vice’s article, accusations of politically motivated content 
curation have increased in both volume and frequency, including 
accusations from the President of the United States. 4  Companies like 
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube have evolved into popular sources for 
breaking news and act as a primary means of communication for millions 
of people.5 The expanding influence of social media has led some to call 
these platforms the new “town square.”6  Business executives are using 
social media to engage with consumers.7  Political leaders are taking to 
 
1. Alex Thompson, Twitter Appears to Have Fixed “Shadow Ban” of Prominent Republicans 




3. Vijaya Gadde & Kayvon Beykpour, Setting the Record Straight on Shadow Banning, 
TWITTER BLOG (July 26, 2018), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2018/Setting-the-record 
-straight-on-shadow-banning.html [https://perma.cc/4JMA-BQH7]. 
4. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2018, 6:46 AM), https://twitter.c 
om/realDonaldTrump/status/1022447980408983552 [https://perma.cc/AYM4-TRLF] (“Twitter 
‘SHADOW BANNING’ prominent Republicans. Not good. We will look into this discriminatory and 
illegal practice at once! Many complaints.”). Just before this Note was published, Twitter permanently 
suspended President Trump’s personal Twitter account following the storming of the Capitol on January 
6, 2021.  
5. Elisa Shearer, Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a News Source, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/social-media-outpaces 
-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/ [https://perma.cc/WQ3K-MH9E] (explaining “[o]ne-
in-five U.S. adults say they often get news via social media, slightly higher than the share who often do 
so from print newspapers (16%)”). 
6. Brian Kane, Social Media is the New Town Square: The Difficulty in Blocking Access to 
Public Accounts, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. (Feb. 2018), https://www.naag.org/publications/nagtri-
journal/volume-3-number-1/social-media-is-the-new-town-square-the-difficulty-in-blocking-access-to-
public-accounts.php [https://perma.cc/3DEQ-RD26]. 
7. See Allana Akhtar, 4 Things the Best CEOs Do on Social Media to Make Authentic 
Connections with Their Followers, BUS. INSIDER (June 11, 2019, 8:22 AM), https://www.businessinside 
 











social media to discuss new initiatives and policies.8 Athletes and celebrities 
are using these platforms to provide social commentary and to galvanize 
supporters and fans.9 In sum, social media has spread rapidly throughout 
society and is now present in most Americans’ lives in innumerable ways.10  
While the evidence of shadow-banning in this instance is speculative and 
contested,11 these allegations and others have spurred many conversations 
about social media, content curation, and free speech. More specifically, 
scholars and politicians are asking how much censorship power is 
appropriate for these social media companies.12 In this era of “fake news,” 
“hot takes,” and political polarization when society seems more and more 
reliant on social media, we must reevaluate how these companies regulate 
the content on their platforms. In particular, this means revisiting Section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) in order to ensure that 
these powerful companies foster a vibrant and open marketplace of ideas.  
This Note will explain the critical distinction between “publishers” and 
“platforms,” why social media entities are currently considered “platforms,” 
and why the legal system should reevaluate the liability of social media 
entities based on how they moderate and regulate content. Part I of this Note 
will discuss the history of the common-law liability of content providers 
prior to the invention of the internet. It will also explore the history and 
rationale for enacting Section 230 of the CDA. Part II of this Note will 
explain the distinction between “publishers” and “platforms” as it relates to 
defamation liability. Further, it will discuss the rapid growth of social media 
 
r.com/why-and-how-ceos-should-use-social-media-2019-6 [https://perma.cc/5J9T-25MB] (“Celebrities 
and influencers aren’t the only ones using social media to bolster their career. Chief Executive Officers 
. . . are using Facebook, Instagram, and LinkedIn more than ever to build an online following.”). See 
also James Crowley, Dave Portnoy Announces Barstool Fund to Aid Small Businesses Impacted by 
Covid, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/dave-portnoy-announces-barstool-fun 
d-small-businesses-covid-1555783 [https://perma.cc/9NW3-GHH2] (“In a video he tweeted out, 
[Barstool Sports CEO Dave] Portnoy said that [Barstool Sports] was setting up the $500,000 fund to try 
to help restaurants get to the next month until the coronavirus pandemic ends.”). 
8. See JOHN H. PARMALEE & SHANNON L. BICHARD, POLITICS AND THE TWITTER 
REVOLUTION: HOW TWEETS INFLUENCE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE 
PUBLIC 35–37 (2012). 
9. Jiahui Zhuang, I’m Your Fan – Engaging in Celebrity’s Social Media Page with the 
Mediation of Parasocial Interaction and Parasocial Relationship, GRADUATE THESES & 
DISSERTATIONS (2018), http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7252. 
10. As of February 2019, it was estimated that 72% of Americans use at least one type of social 
media. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/ 
fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/43A3-82RS]. 
11. Gadde & Beykpour, supra note 3; see also Cal Jeffrey, USPTO Grants Facebook Patent for 
Automated Shadow-Banning System, TECHSPOT (July 16, 2019, 1:32 PM), https://www.techspot.com/ne 
ws/80979-uspto-grants-facebook-patent-automated-shadow-banning-system.html [https://perma.cc/2S 
87-P2LM] (“[T]here has never been any definitive proof that moderators and social networking 
platforms execute shadow bans . . . .”). Shadow-banning is more thoroughly explained in Part II.b.  
12. Cf. Anupam Chander & Vivek Krishnamurthy, The Myth of Platform Neutrality, 2 GEO. L. 
TECH. REV. 400, 404–06 (2018) (arguing that many social media algorithms can create “echo chambers,” 












during the internet age and its impact on communication and the spread of 
information. It will also discuss the cryptic and often vague algorithmic 
process that social media companies use to decide which content is visible 
to users. Part III of this Note will analyze the current liability of social media 
companies as a “platform” and will discuss the argument that social media 
is the twenty-first century’s “town square.” Part IV will explain three key 
pieces of recently proposed legislation that may affect Section 230 of the 
CDA. Part V of this Note will explain specific changes that social media 
companies must make to avoid the enhanced defamation liability of moving 
from the “platform” category to the “publisher” category. Part VI will 
discuss a few legislative and executive solutions to allow Section 230 of the 
CDA to reflect the current internet landscape by focusing on pushing social 
media companies toward transparent content-moderation practices.  
I. DEFAMATION AND THE CREATION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY 
ACT 
To fully grasp the conversations and debate surrounding the legal 
implications of content-moderation processes such as “shadow-banning,” it 
is necessary to understand defamation liability as it developed under the 
common law. It is also critical to understand how this liability developed 
and changed in order to foster the growth of the internet. This section will 
discuss defamation liability under the common law through the enactment 
of the Communications Decency Act.  
A. Defamation Under the Common Law 
Defamation liability arises when three elements are present: (1) there is 
an unprivileged publication; (2) the publication is false and defamatory; and 
(3) the publication is actionable irrespective of special harm or is the legal 
cause of special harm to the other.13 Any person or entity that publishes a 
defamatory statement assumes liability equivalent to having been the initial 
purveyor of the statement.14 For entities that provide information or content, 
the assumed liability is categorized into two principal categories: publishers 
and distributors.15 
 
13. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. L. INST. 1938). 
14. Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications Decency Act, DIGIT. MEDIA L. 
PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/immunity-online-publishers-under-communications-decenc 
y-act [https://perma.cc/E6U4-X9WQ] (“Under standard common-law principles, a person who 
publishes a defamatory statement by another bears the same liability for the statement as if he or she had 
initially created it.”). 
15. Throughout this Note, the terms “platform” and “distributor” will be used interchangeably.  











Publishers, including book publishers and newspapers such as the New 
York Times, are liable for any content that appears in their publications.16 
The basis for this liability is that these publishers review and curat their 
content, so they have full knowledge of the material they were releasing to 
the public. 17  Thus, common-law publishers are held to a higher legal 
standard because of their subjective editorialization of content. 18 
Conversely, distributors (non-digital “platforms”) such as libraries, 
bookstores, and newspaper stands are not held liable for the content they 
disperse.19  The rationale is that it is not feasible or practical to expect 
libraries and newspaper stands to know all of the content that they possess 
and or provide to the public because the content is voluminous and comes 
from a variety of sources.20  Accordingly, distributors are not subject to 
defamation liability for the content of the sources they provided. Put in 
today’s terms with real-world examples: 
Typically, publishers are considered to have editorial judgment, 
while platforms lack it. From this perspective, the Harvard Business 
Review, The Atlantic, and The New York Times are classic 
“publishers”—they present highly-curated content, and their editors 
invest a lot of time in its creation. Google, Facebook, and Twitter are 
classic “platforms”—they distribute other peoples’ content without 
as much editorial oversight. But these differences are largely cultural. 
It’s not technologically difficult for publishers to add platform-like 
elements, and vice versa.21 
Under the common law, websites that do not or cannot review all of their 
content operate as “platforms” or “distributors.”22 
 
16. Immunity for Online Publishers, supra note 14. 
17. Id. 
18. See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding that Prodigy is a publisher because “Prodigy’s conscious choice, to gain the 
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe and other computer 
networks that make no such choice.”), superseded by statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
19. Immunity for Online Publishers, supra note 14. 
20. Id. (“The concern is that it would be impossible for distributors to read every publication 
before they sell or distribute it, and that as a result, distributors would engage in excessive self-
censorship.”). 
21. Lydia Laurenson, Don’t Try to Be a Publisher and a Platform at the Same Time, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Jan. 19, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/01/dont-try-to-be-a-publisher-and-a-platform-at-the-same-ti 
me [https://perma.cc/LTF2-KC9A].  
22. See, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(“CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publication than does a public library, book 
store, or newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine every publication it 












B. The Rise of the Internet and the Origin of Section 230 of the CDA 
Before 1996, the aforementioned common-law distinctions provided the 
basis for liability for internet content providers. This common-law 
standard—as applied to the internet—was called into question after Stratton 
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.23 Prodigy was an internet company 
that hosted online bulletin boards with over two million subscribers and 
sixty thousand posts per day.24 Prodigy oversaw the content of the bulletin 
boards and occasionally removed posts that were “offensive” or “in bad 
taste.”25 The court held that Prodigy’s practice of moderating some of the 
content on its platform required that it assume liability for all of the content 
on its platform.26 In other words, to be a platform and thus avoid liability 
under the common-law standard of defamation, there could be no content 
moderation whatsoever.  
The Stratton Oakmont decision in 1995 initiated a swift legislative 
response. In an attempt to “regulate obscenity and indecency online,” 
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act just a year later.27 In 
response to Stratton Oakmont, Congress addressed the question of internet 
liability through a proposed amendment to the CDA.28  
The amendment was intended to encourage free speech online by 
shielding interactive computer services from most common-law defamation 
liability.29 The amendment was formalized as Section 230 of the CDA, 
which effectively grants internet service providers immunity for 
information provided by a third party, thus treating them differently than 
publishers in print. 30  Specifically, the language of Section 230(c)(1) 
stipulates that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall 
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
 
23. 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), superseded by statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
24. Id.; see also CDA 230: Legislative History, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/iss 
ues/cda230/legislative-history [https://perma.cc/JR7E-GFZW]. 
25. CDA 230: Legislative History, supra note 24.  
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. (“Worried about the future of free speech online and responding directly to Stratton 
Oakmont, Representatives Chris Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) introduced an amendment to the 
Communications Decency Act that would end up becoming Section 230.”); see also Matt Laslo, The 
Fight over Section 230—and the Internet as We Know It, WIRED (Aug. 13, 2019, 3:18 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/fight-over-section-230-internet-as-we-know-it/ [https://perma.cc/UM33-
VSDC] (“Section 230 wasn’t crafted to shield companies for the heck of it. The fear was that if 
companies could be held responsible for all the content its users posted simply because they moderated 
some of it . . . they wouldn’t moderate anything at all.”). 
29. Immunity for Online Publishers, supra note 14. 
30. See Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google Is About to 
Change, NPR (Mar. 21, 2018, 5:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21/59 
1622450/section-230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change [https://perma.cc/QC 
36-AHWE]. 











another information content provider.”31 This intent was highlighted in the 
Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that it was Congress’s intent in Section 230 to 
treat “distributors” differently than “publishers” under the law. 32  Other 
circuits have reliably agreed with the analysis in Zeran by refusing to hold 
internet entities liable for certain content published by third parties.33 
Congress enacted Section 230 at the dawn of the internet age,34 and the 
statute has had a profound effect on the development of free speech on the 
internet over the past quarter of a century.35 Section 230 has been referred 
to as one of the most critical pieces of legislation impacting the “freedom of 
expression.” 36  This is unsurprising as its primary intent was to foster 
creativity and a competitive market in the internet space.37 Section 230 
defines both interactive computer services 38  and information content 
providers.39 The difference between these terms plays a meaningful role in 
assessing defamation liability.40  
An interactive computer service is “any information service, system, or 
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by 
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or 
system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or 
 
31. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). See also Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, 141 S. 
Ct. 13, 14 (2020) (J. Thomas denying certioriari) (stating that “§230(c)(1) indicates that an Internet 
provider does not become the publisher of a piece of third-party content—and thus subjected to strict 
liability— simply by hosting or distributing that content.”). 
32. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997). 
33. See, e.g., Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(“Congress clearly enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for 
the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.”) (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d 327); Klayman v. 
Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d 327). 
34. “An umbrella term for the 21st century, in which information travels around the world in 
seconds and is made available to people in more countries than ever before. It is also a moniker for high-
speed communications, the convergence of computers and consumer electronics (CE) and wireless 
devices.” Internet Age, PCMAG, https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/internet-age [https://perma 
.cc/LQ4Z-7WXG]. 
35. See Selyukh, supra note 30 (“This 1996 statute became known as ‘a core pillar of Internet 
freedom’ and ‘the law that gave us modern Internet’—a critical component of free speech online.”). 
36. See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 
2313 (2014) (“Section 230 . . . [has] been among the most important protections of free expression in 
the United States in the digital age.”); see also Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/3JRQ-GN89] (referring to 
Section 230 as “one of the most valuable tools for protecting freedom of expression and innovation on 
the Internet”). 
37. “Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act (CDA) in part to carve out a sphere of 
immunity from liability for providers of interactive computer services to preserve that ‘vibrant and 
competitive free market’ of ideas on the Internet.” Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Validity, 
Construction, and Application of Immunity Provisions of Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 
230, 52 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 37 (2011). 
38. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
39. § 230(f)(3) (“The term ‘information content provider’ means any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the 
Internet or any other interactive computer service.”). 












services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 41  Conversely, 
information content providers may be, and often are, third-party users.42 
Section 230 effectively grants interactive computer services immunity from 
defamation liability43 for third-party content present on their websites.44 In 
practice, this means that if a Twitter user posts a video to Twitter, the user 
(as the information content provider) may be liable for defamation, but 
Twitter (as the interactive computer service) would not be liable. 45 
However, Section 230 immunity may be forfeited where the interactive 
computer service curates or censors the content on its site.46 
II. SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE INFLUENCE OF SECTION 230 OF THE CDA 
A. Overview of the Publisher v. Platform Distinction on the Internet 
The early 2000s saw the rapid expansion of the internet, bringing people 
from around the world online. 47  Entrepreneurs took advantage of the 
newfound marketplace, and social networking companies like Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube were born. 48  Ever since, social media use has 
boomed—both in terms of quantity of users and influence on users.49 Social 
media is defined as “forms of electronic communication (such as websites 
 
41. § 230(f)(2). 
42. See § 230(f)(3); cf. VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10306, LIABILITY FOR 
CONTENT HOSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNICATION DECENCY ACT’S SECTION 230 2 (June 6, 
2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10306. 
43. Section 230 does not provide immunity from intellectual property infringement or violations 
of federal criminal law. See Mark Sullivan, The 1996 Law That Made the Web Is in the Crosshairs, FAST 
CO. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90273352/maybe-its-time-to-take-away-the-outdat 
ed-loophole-that-big-tech-exploits [https://perma.cc/8FLU-UWZ6].  
44. “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” § 230(c)(1). See also 
Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, 141 S. Ct. 13 (2020) (“In short, the statute suggests 
that if a company unknowingly leaves up illegal third-party content, it is protected from publisher 
liability by §230(c)(1); and if it takes down certain third-party content in good faith, it is protected by 
§230(c)(2)(A).”). 
45. This immunity is not without certain exceptions. § 230(e) outlines its effect on other laws, 
explicitly stating that the provision does not have any effect on criminal law, intellectual property law, 
state law, communications privacy law, or sex-trafficking law. See § 230(e).  
46. VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45650, FREE SPEECH AND THE REGULATION 
OF SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT 12 (2019) (citing Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157, 1170, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45650.pdf.  
47. See generally Internet Growth Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS: USAGE & POPULATION 
STATS., https://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm [https://perma.c c/8ZA8-BL5F]  
48. See generally Saqib Shah, The History of Social Networking, DIGIT. TRENDS (May 14, 2016), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking/ [https://perma.cc/6TQT-P3C 
9]. 
49. Andrew Perrin & Monica Anderson, Share of U.S. Adults Using Social Media, Including 
Facebook, Is Mostly Unchanged Since 2018, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch 
.org/fact-tank/2019/04/10/share-of-u-s-adults-using-social-media-including-facebook-is-mostly-uncha 
nged-since-2018/ [https://perma.cc/S8AE-2E9D]. 











for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online 
communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other 
content (such as videos).”50 Thus, websites such as Twitter and Reddit are 
essentially open forums, or platforms, providing an arena for candid 
discussion across the spectrum of ideologies and opinions.51 In line with the 
intended protections of Section 230, this characterization states that “[t]he 
Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true 
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”52  
B. Introduction to Shadow-Banning 
Shadow-banning is a method of content moderation that is “used to ban 
people from forums or message boards without alerting them that they’ve 
been banned.”53 In other words, it is a means for social media platforms to 
“hide” or “ban” certain users for posting content they deem to be 
inappropriate for the platform without informing the user or pointing to a 
specific guideline or rule that was violated. Shadow-banning is not a new 
idea; in fact, it has been around nearly as long as interactive computer 
services have existed.54 Moderators of chat rooms and message boards, such 
as those on Reddit, have long been able to disable comments or terminate 
accounts of “disruptive participants.” 55  This was not always effective, 
however, because the users could simply create a new account and continue 
to participate in the online community.56 To solve this problem, moderators 
 
50. Social Media, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%2 
0media [https://perma.cc/DJF2-LAMS]. 
51. Distinguishing between “publishers” and “platforms” is not always easy. See Malwarebytes, 
Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, 141 S. Ct. 13 (2020) (“To be sure, recognizing some overlap 
between publishers and distributors is not unheard of. Sources sometimes use language that arguably 
blurs the distinction between publishers and distributors.”). 
52. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3). 
53. See Samantha Cole, Where Did the Concept of ‘Shadow Banning’ Come From?, VICE (July 
31, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3q744/where-did-shadow-banning-come-from-trump-r 
epublicans-shadowbanned [https://perma.cc/F92K-696D]; see also G.F., The Economist Explains: What 
is “Shadowbanning”?, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-ex 
plains/2018/08/01/what-is-shadowbanning [https://perma.cc/2GR6-FEU3]. The article explains:  
Shadowbanned users are not told that they have been affected. They can continue to post 
messages, add new followers and comment on or reply to other posts. But their messages may 
not appear in the feed, their replies may be suppressed and they may not show up in searches 
for their usernames. The only hint that such a thing is happening would be a dip in likes, 
favourites or retweets—or an ally alerting them to their disappearance. 
Id. 
54. See Barbara Ortutay, AP Explains: What Is Shadow Banning?, AP NEWS (Sept. 5, 2018), htt 
ps://www.apnews.com/8ee05a6abfe54131874428b0671b1e15 [https://perma.cc/5XYP-7GUA]. 













began to disable these users secretly, allowing the user to believe he or she 
was still an active participant, albeit with no engagement from other users.57  
Politically conservative users have recently alleged they have been 
shadow-banned and have argued that prominent social media sites like 
Twitter and YouTube have used the process to suppress conservative talking 
points in favor of liberal points of view.58 Specifically, the allegations are 
that when a user searches for specific, notable conservative political figures 
in the search box, the names do not appear. 59  Of course, this is not 
necessarily evidence of political censorship. But the belief that companies 
are engaging in such censorship is prevalent and not solely held by 
purported victims—a majority of Americans believe that social media 
companies engage in political censorship.60  
Despite the pervasive belief that political censorship is occurring, 
evidence of explicit shadow-banning is scarce. While this may be because 
reports of shadow-banning are merely rumors, it may also be because it is 
nearly impossible to collect non-circumstantial evidence without more 
information from the social media companies. 61  Those who make the 
argument that shadow-banning is a problem point to changes in the 
algorithms used by the platforms, which control both the visibility of 
content and the prioritization of the content shown to all users.62 In fact, 
many that deny the existence of shadow-banning believe that shadow-
banning is simply a conspiracy theory born out of the lack of transparency 
reflected in the algorithms used to determine which content appears on a 
user’s feed.63 Social media companies like Twitter that use algorithms to 
curate their content acknowledged that the algorithms may result in certain 
tweets not appearing as frequently as others, which may lead to certain 
 
57. Id. 
58. See Harper Neidig, PragerU Sues Google, YouTube for ‘Censoring’ Conservative Videos, 
THE HILL (Oct. 24, 2017, 5:22 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/356966-prageru-sues-google-
youtube-for-censoring-conservative-videos [https://perma.cc/MK6Y-ASVU]. 
59. G.F., supra note 53. See also Philip Bump, Trump ‘Shadow Ban’ Tweet: A F.A.Q., WASH. 
POST (July 26, 2018, 7:58 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/07/26/trump-
shadow-ban-tweet-a-f-a-q/ [https://perma.cc/RQ7J-T2J8] (“Normally, if you go to the search bar on 
Twitter.com and type someone’s name, you’ll get a list of suggested accounts. Type ‘Trump,’ for 
example and, as of writing, you get the president, the first lady and Ivanka Trump, among others. I get 
other options, too, like @trumphop, a bot I created that retweets old Trump tweets on the same day and 
time that he originally tweeted them. Which is to say: The results are customized.”). 
60. Roughly Seven-in-Ten Americans Think It Likely That Social Media Platforms Censor 
Political Viewpoints, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 26, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/06/2 
8/public-attitudes-toward-technology-companies/pi_2018-06-28_tech-companies_0-01/ [https://perma. 
cc/WAU5-2YAZ]. 
61. Cf. Personalization Based on Where You See Twitter Content Across the Web, TWITTER 
BLOG, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/tailored-suggestions [https:// perma.cc/S7FJ-QSH9]. 
62. G.F., supra note 53. 
63. Id.  











political commentators and users being unintentionally prioritized over 
others.64  
The apprehension over the algorithms results from potential bias in how 
these entities present search results. Twitter ranks tweets higher if it believes 
they are relevant to the user or tweets that are popular at the time of search.65 
Conversely, tweets from “bad-faith actors who intend to manipulate or 
divide the conversation are ranked lower.”66  Facebook generates search 
results based on factors such as pages a user follows, groups the user has 
joined, events a user has “liked,” a user’s previous searches, and information 
available on a user’s profile.67  
Twitter (via founder Jack Dorsey) has recognized that its search-result 
algorithm has previously biased search results, admitting that the 
“algorithms were unfairly filtering 600,000 accounts, including some 
members of Congress, from [their] search auto-complete and latest 
 
64. Cf. Selyukh, supra note 30. 
65. Search Result FAQ’s, TWITTER BLOG, https://help.twitter.com/en/ using-twitter/top-search-
results-faqs [https://perma.cc/R8UK-YHZD] (the other factors are not discussed in detail). 
66. Matt Southern, Twitter Reveals How It Ranks Tweets in Search Results, SEARCH ENGINE J. 
(July 31, 2018), https://www.searchenginejournal.com/twitter-reveals-how-it-ranks-tweets-in-search-re 
sults/263869/ [https://perma.cc/THT9-W89J]. 
67. Matt Southern, Facebook Explains How Its Search Results Work, SEARCH ENGINE J. (Nov. 













results.”68 Although Mr. Dorsey went on to assure the public that Twitter 
had taken steps to correct for the partiality in the algorithm, there is currently 
no legal requirement to do so under Section 230 of the CDA.69  
III. SOCIAL MEDIA: THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY’S “TOWN SQUARE”? 
As it stands, social media companies are considered platforms, meaning 
they are not liable for third-party content. Rather, they provide the 
opportunity for large numbers of third-party users to exchange 
information.70 Because they do not screen user-generated content before it 
is posted on the platform, all content moderation is ex post.71 Generally, 
social media sites limit their content moderation to subjects that clearly fall 
within the specific categories listed in Section 230, 72  including posts 
encouraging violence or terrorism, sexual exploitation, adult content, or 
illegal activities.73 However, some have begun to argue that given the role 
that social media plays in society today, it should be subject to the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech clause.74  Despite the First Amendment only 
limiting governmental actors, advocates of this position focus their 
argument on the public forum doctrine.75 
 




69. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
70. John Samples, Why the Government Should Not Regulate Content Moderation of Social 
Media, CATO INST. (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/why-government-
should-not-regulate-content-moderation-social-media [https://perma.cc/QJY9-H5BF]. 
71. Id. Social media platforms’ use of ex post content moderation is a significant difference from 
how traditional publishers moderate content. Typical publishers, such as newspapers, conduct all of their 
content moderation ex ante.  
72. § 230(c)(2)(A) (stating that no interactive computer service may be held liable to restrict 
material that the provider or users consider “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”). 
73. See, e.g., The Twitter Rules: Safety, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/t 
witter-rules [https://perma.cc/78JE-77MP]; Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.c 
om/communitystandards/introduction [https://perma.cc/KW2J-8E EC]. 
74. See generally David L. Hudson Jr., In the Age of Social Media, Expand the Reach of the First 
Amendment, 43 A.B.A. HUM. RTS. MAG. 2, 4 (2019) (“The Court should interpret the First Amendment 
to limit the ‘unreasonably restrictive and oppressive conduct’ by certain powerful, private entities—such 
as social media entities—that flagrantly censor freedom of expression.”). 
75. Id. at 3. However, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to go so far, holding that 
“[p]roviding some kind of forum for speech is not an activity that only governmental entities have 
traditionally performed. Therefore, a private entity who provides a forum for speech is not transformed 
by that fact alone into a state actor.” Manhattan Cmty Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 
(2019). 











A. The Public Forum Doctrine 
The Supreme Court created the public forum doctrine in 1939 as a way 
to preserve freedom of expression amongst citizens in public spaces.76 The 
public forum doctrine “prescribes rules limiting the government’s ability to 
regulate speech in areas created for the purpose of speech . . . .”77 Traditional 
public forums have consisted of “places which by long tradition or by 
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate” such as streets, 
parks, and town squares.78 Proponents of applying the public forum doctrine 
suggest that, given the significant control and power that companies like 
Twitter and Facebook exhibit over communication today, these companies 
“are analogous to a governmental actor” in spreading public information. 79 
Proponents conclude, therefore, that the First Amendment requirement to 
not infringe on free speech ought to apply to such entities because they have 
become a modern day town square.80 
In Packingham v. North Carolina,81 the Supreme Court looked favorably 
on such a comparison. In Packingham, the Court appeared receptive to 
social media platforms being akin to a town square, recognizing social 
media’s widespread use and its function as a forum to exchange ideas and 
viewpoints. 82  The Court found that social media platforms enable 
individuals to engage in protected First Amendment activity, touching a 
wide variety of topics and interests.83 When deciding whether a state may 
 
76. Many trace the origins of the public forum doctrine to Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 
U.S. 496 (1939). In the opinion, Justice Owen Roberts held: 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for 
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the 
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, 
rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets 
and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of 
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort 
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of 
regulation, be abridged or denied. 
Id. at 515–16.  
77. Micah Telegen, You Can’t Say That!: Public Forum Doctrine and Viewpoint Discrimination 
in the Social Media Era, 52 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 235, 238 (2018). 
78. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
79. Hudson Jr., supra note 74, at 3; see id. (“This societal development and change in 
communications capacities require that the antiquated state action doctrine be modified lest the law 
become ossified. The time has come to recognize that the reach of the First Amendment be expanded.”). 
80. Id. 
81. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
82. “While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places 
(in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast 
democratic forums of the Internet’ in general . . . and social media particular. Seven in ten American 
adults use at least one Internet social networking service.” Id. at 1735 (quoting Reno v. Am. Civ. 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997). 












prevent an individual from accessing social media, the Court held that a 
statute preventing social media access infringes on an individual’s First 
Amendment rights because “[t]hese websites can provide perhaps the most 
powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice 
heard.”84  
The Packingham decision illustrates that access to social media is not a 
luxury, but is critical to furthering public discourse—thereby supporting the 
idea that social media is closer than ever before to a “public forum.”85 This 
idea is continuing to gain legal support. For example, the Second Circuit 
recently held that President Trump could not block Twitter users from 
reading his tweets because he uses Twitter86 for government business.87 The 
court suggested that debate between government officials and political 
opposites is a necessary and vital part of open online discussion—further 
fueling the notion that social media is a public forum, serving as the new 
town square.88 
B. The Future of Section 230 
Washington has turned its focus to Section 230 as social media has 
grown more prevalent, both politically and more generally. The recent 
debate regarding the future of social media regulation has led to many 
legislators proposing new regulations for “Big Tech.” 89  Proponents of 
 
84. Id. at 1737; see id. (further explaining “to foreclose access to social media altogether is to 
prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. . . . Even convicted 
criminals . . . might receive legitimate benefits from these means for access to the world of ideas, in 
particular if they seek to reform and to pursue lawful and rewarding lives.”). 
85. “To determine whether a public forum has been created, courts look ‘to the policy and 
practice of the government’ as well as ‘the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive 
activity to discern the government’s intent.’” Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 
928 F.3d 226, 237 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 802 (1985); see also id. (“Opening an instrumentality of communication ‘for indiscriminate 
use by the general public’ creates a public forum.”) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983). 
86. Id. at 237 (explaining President Trump’s Twitter account “was intentionally opened for 
public discussion when the President, upon assuming office, repeatedly used the Account as an official 
vehicle for governance and made its interactive features accessible to the public without limitation” and 
holding that “this conduct created a public forum”). 
87. Charlie Savage, Trump Can’t Block Critics from His Twitter Account, Appeals Court Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/us/politics/trump-twitter-first-amend 
ment.html [https://perma.cc/GM33-R3QE]. 
88. See generally Knight, 928 F.3d at 226. 
89. VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10309, REGULATING BIG TECH: LEGAL 
IMPLICATIONS 1 (Sept. 11, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10309.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W9R-
SDVC]. “Big Tech” often refers to five tech companies: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and 
Microsoft. Id. However, many of the pieces of pending legislation seem to define “big tech” in terms of 
monthly users, such as companies “with more than 30 million active monthly users in the U.S., more 
than 300 million active monthly users worldwide, or who have more than $500 million in global annual 
 











amending Section 230 correctly point out that at the time of its enactment, 
the internet was nothing like the internet we have today. 90  While the 
complaints concerning shadow-banning have predominantly come from 
Republicans, amending Section 230 has drawn attention from both sides of 
the aisle.91 Conservatives have argued that social media companies violate 
“the spirit of the law” by censoring conservative users.92  Liberals have 
argued that social media companies have done a poor job taking down 
“problematic content” and “tackling harassment” due to Section 230 
protections.93 As it stands, there are three prominent pieces of proposed 
legislation focused on amending Section 230: (1) The “Ending Support for 
Internet Censorship Act,”94 (2) the “Biased Algorithm Deterrence Act,”95 
and (3) the “Algorithmic Accountability Act.”96 The first two suggest that 
social media companies ought to be required to relax their content-
moderation tactics; the third suggests these companies ought to be able to 
moderate further.  
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION IMPACTING SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS 
The “Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act,” proposed by Senator 
Josh Hawley (R-MO) in June of 2019, would allow social media platforms 
to be sued “unless companies submit to an external audit by the Federal 
Trade Commission [FTC] that proves by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ 
that they do not moderate content ‘in a politically biased manner.’”97 The 
bill has three primary objectives: (1) remove automatic immunity from “big 
 
revenue.” See Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech 
Companies, JOSH HAWLEY, U.S. SENATOR FOR MISSOURI (June 19, 2019), https://www.hawley.senate.g 
ov/senator-hawley-introduces-legislation-amend-section-230-immunity-big-tech-companies [https://pe 
rma.cc/28JQ-5ZSR]. 
90. See Laslo, supra note 28 (quoting Senator Hawley, “The world has changed. The Internet 
has changed, and I think we need to keep pace with change. The dominant, monopoly-sized platforms 
that exist today didn’t exist then. The business model they employ today wasn’t employed then.”). 
91. Id. (“In Congress, both parties have singled Section 230 out for attack, with some Democrats 
saying it allows tech companies to get away with not moderating content enough, while some 
Republicans say it enables them to moderate too much.”). Importantly, Section 230 is facing scrutiny 
for other reasons as well, including its application to fake news. See, e.g., Andrea Butler, Note, 
Protecting the Democratic Role of the Press: A Legal Solution to Fake News, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 419 
(2018).  
92. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Legal Shield for Social Media Is Targeted by Trump, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/business/section-230-internet-speech.html [http 
s://perma.cc/W5BA-6DZL]. 
93. Id. 
94. Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019). 
95. Biased Algorithm Deterrence Act of 2019, H.R. 492, 116th Cong. (2019).  
96. Algorithmic Accountability Act, S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019).  
97. James Pethokoukis, Josh Hawley’s New Tech Bill Would Blow Up the Internet, THE WEEK 













tech companies”; (2) allow these big tech companies the ability to regain 
that immunity by submitting to an FTC audit; and (3) preserve the currently 
existing immunity for small and mid-size tech companies.98 
The “Biased Algorithm Deterrent Act of 2019,” proposed by Rep. Louie 
Gohmert (R-TX), “would provide that social media services ‘shall be 
treated as a publisher or speaker’ of certain user-generated content if they 
display it ‘in an order other than chronological order.’”99 Further, the bill 
would hold any social media company liable as a publisher of user-
generated content if a company or its algorithm delays the display of some 
content and not others, or if it “hinders the display of such content” for 
reasons other than to carry out the user’s direction or to restrict material for 
reasons not explicitly listed in Section 230 of the CDA.100  
Each of these two pieces of proposed legislation seeks to curtail the 
immunity offered by Section 230 drastically. The “Ending Support for 
Internet Censorship Act” essentially requires that big tech companies prove 
to the government that they should be afforded Section 230 immunity by 
requiring them to demonstrate that they are politically neutral platforms.101 
Many have expressed concerns with the bill, specifically citing its failure to 
narrowly define “political viewpoint,” as well as its implication that all 
political positions and groups are “equally legitimate.” 102  The “Biased 
Algorithm Deterrent Act of 2019” goes even further, stipulating that 
platforms that seek to be afforded Section 230 immunity may only organize 
and present their content in one way.103  In either case, the implications 
would be broad, as they may disincentivize entrepreneurs from entering the 
social media space altogether.  
The “Algorithmic Accountability Act,” proposed by Senators Cory 
Booker (D-NJ) and Ron Wyden (D-OR), would have the FTC enact rules 
which analyze “‘highly sensitive’ automated systems,” primarily evaluating 
algorithmic tools for discrimination, bias, and privacy risks.104 This bill 
principally focuses on increasing transparency in the decision-making 
process of interactive computer service’s algorithms and how they present 
 
98. See Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech 
Companies, supra note 89.  
99. BRANNON, supra note 89, at 3. 
100. H.R. 492. 
101. See Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019). 
102. Eric Goldman, Comments on Sen. Hawley’s “[Ending] Support for Internet Censorship Act”, 
TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (July 10, 2019), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/07/comment 
s-on-sen-hawleys-ending-support-for-internet-censorship-act.htm [https://perma.cc/BJ3A-JURG]. 
103. See H.R. 492. 
104. Adi Robertson, A New Bill Would Force Companies to Check Their Algorithms for Bias, THE 
VERGE (Apr. 10, 2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/10/18304960/congress-algorithmi 
c-accountability-act-wyden-clarke-booker-bill-introduced-house-senate. [https://perma.cc/493M-NHG 
Y]. The bill is “aimed at major companies with access to large amounts of information. It would apply 
to companies that . . . primarily act as data brokers that buy and sell consumer data.” Id. 











information regarding “race, color, national origin, political opinions, 
religion” and more.105  
Unlike the previously discussed bills, the “Algorithmic Accountability 
Act” focuses primarily on the unintentional discriminatory decisions made 
by a social media company’s algorithm.106 This legislation focuses less on 
perceived political biases and more on “tech practices that lead to ‘houses 
that you never know are for sale, job opportunities that never present 
themselves, and financing that you never become aware of.’”107 While the 
focus is not the same, the underlying premise is similar—that social media 
companies must be held accountable for failing to maintain neutrality with 
respect to how they decide to present user-generated content.108 Each of 
these pieces of legislation would add regulation to internet services already 
subject to Section 230, and if enacted, would vastly change the internet as 
we know it.  
V. HOW SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES CAN REFORM CONTENT 
MODERATION PRACTICES AND MAINTAIN “PLATFORM” LIABILITY 
Neither extending the First Amendment protections to the realm of social 
media109 nor enacting any of the aforementioned pieces of legislation110 is 
necessary (nor preferred) in order to reach the outcome that many seek. 
While it is clear that there may be a time where Section 230 will need to be 
revisited,111 there are some interim solutions that social media companies 
may put in place to balance their Section 230 immunity with the growing 
concerns of content-moderation practices. It is worth noting that courts have 
 
105. Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, S. 1108, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Jerry 
Barbanel, A Look at the Proposed Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, IAPP (Apr. 29, 2019), https://i 
app.org/news/a/a-look-at-the-proposed-algorithmic-accountability-act-of-2019/ [https://perma.cc/SD58 
-2V8X]. 
106. See Taylor Hatmaker, Democrats Draw Up Bill That Would Require Tech Platforms to 
Assess Algorithmic Bias, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:26 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/10/al 
gorithmic-accountability-act/ [https://perma.cc/L2PL-64N9] (“‘By requiring large companies to not turn 
a blind eye toward[] unintended impacts of their automated systems, the Algorithmic Accountability Act 
ensures 21st Century technologies are tools of empowerment, rather than marginalization, while also 
bolstering the security and privacy of all consumers,’ Rep. Clarke said.”). 
107. Id. (quoting Sen. Cory Booker). 
108. See S. 1108. 
109. Supra Part III. 
110. Supra Part IV. 
111. Some argue that the “political will currently exists to make changes to the ways in which 
online platforms are held accountable for the content posted on their sites . . . .” Frank Ready, Timing Is 
Ripe for Section 230 Amendments—But the ‘How’ Is Missing, LAW.COM (Oct. 24, 2019, 11:00 AM), htt 
ps://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2019/10/24/timing-is-ripe-for-section-230-amendments-but-the-how 
-is-missing/ [https://perma.cc/UW9P-5YSR]. With rising concern over fake news, censorship, and hate 
speech on online platforms, some think we are more likely to see changes to Section 230 sooner rather 












“invok[ed] a broad interpretation of immunity”112 and have generally not 
made much of a distinction between social media companies which exercise 
editorial discretion and those that do not.113 However, there are signs that 
this distinction could eventually be made. Notably, the Seventh Circuit has 
long questioned the practical effects of failing to hold websites and ISPs 
which exercise editorial control to a different standard than those that do 
not.114  If courts do seek to make a distinction, social media companies 
should take three key steps to maintain their immunity from defamation 
liability.  
A. Establish Clear Guidelines for Content That Is Appropriate for Their 
Platform 
Social media companies must establish consistent and clear guidelines 
for appropriate (and inappropriate) content to minimize user confusion and 
outrage. Most of these companies have vague and broad guidelines setting 
forth what content is allowed, 115  but the guidelines may be applied 
subjectively by a small group of employees. 116  Additionally, content 
moderation relies predominately on a concept called “community policing,” 
where users report other users for violations—or perceived violations—of 
the content guidelines.117 Concerns have been raised that Twitter’s content 
guidelines, for example, may have a disparate impact on some viewpoints 
 
112. See Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group USA, 141 S. Ct. 13 (2020) (explaining 
that, with respect to §230 “many courts have construed the law broadly to confer sweeping immunity on 
some of the largest companies in the world.”); see also Wakabayashi, supra note 92; see id. (further 
explaining that “Section 230 has also provided legal cover for the complicated decisions regarding 
content moderation. Facebook and Twitter have recently cited it to defend themselves in court when 
users have sued after being barred from the platforms.”). 
113. Butler, supra note 91, at 434 (“[A]n interpretation of § 230 that treats websites and ISPs 
exercising editorial control the same as those that do not defeats the original policy goals of the ‘Good 
Samaritan’ law and likely serves few of the purposes Congress intended.”). 
114. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003). The Doe court discussed that the 
principal purpose of § 230 was to afford immunity to websites and ISPs that exercised editorial discretion 
to remove “offensive material,” highlighting the section entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ 
blocking and screening of offensive material.” Id. In other words, the broad immunity afforded to these 
companies was to encourage the removal of offensive content, not simply whatever content they wanted 
to remove. 
115. See, e.g., Dieter Bohn, One of Twitter’s New Anti-Abuse Measures Is the Oldest Trick in the 
Forum Moderation Book, THE VERGE (Feb. 16, 2017, 9:07 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/2/16/ 
14635030/twitter-shadow-ban-moderation (“Twitter itself has been intentionally vague about what its 
precise policies and tools are . . . .”). 
116. Jillian C. York & Corynne McSherry, Content Moderation Is Broken. Let Us Count the Ways, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/content-moderation-b 
roken-let-us-count-ways [https://perma.cc/B4HA-VH7M] (explaining that throughout the history of 
social media, guidelines have been applied subjectively by employees). 
117. Id.; see also The Joe Rogan Experience, #1258 – Jack Dorsey, Vijaya Gadde & Tim Pool, 
(March 5, 2019) (downloaded using iTunes) (explaining that a certain potentially offensive and violent 
video may not have been removed because it may not have been reported).  











as opposed to others based on the likelihood of certain people to report 
material as offensive.118 Ultimately, it is likely that social media companies 
use information gathered from community policing in different ways, 
though in the past companies like Facebook have kept this process close to 
the chest, revealing little information to the public about this procedure.119  
Companies have attempted to make the moderation process more 
consistent and less subjective by replacing much of the human component 
of content moderation with the aforementioned algorithms and other 
artificial intelligence.120 While this may eliminate the human biases present 
when a person reviews content, concerns of bias and inconsistent results 
largely persist, as previously discussed. 121  Ultimately, social media 
companies must strive to develop specific guidelines that may be applied 
consistently, irrespective of political preference or cultural view.122 One 
suggested solution is to tie content guidelines to the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights.123 In doing so, companies could rely on a 
generally agreed upon set of guidelines which “provide a standard . . . for 
companies to prevent and address the risk of adverse impacts on human 
rights.”124 This idea would establish clear guidelines, but private businesses 
may reject the idea of tying themselves to such a standard by arguing it to 
be unworkable and overbroad. However, the idea to build off an existing set 
of guidelines would certainly help ensure that content-moderation decisions 
are consistent.125  A consistent process will push the content-moderation 
practices closer to the “platform” category rather than the “publisher” 
category. Adopting a clear and agreed-upon set of rules that may be applied 
across all content regardless of viewpoint or user mitigates opportunity for 
editorial decision-making—a critical part of being a “publisher.”126 
 
118. See The Joe Rogan Experience, supra note 117 (explaining that some users have been banned 
for misgendering a transgender person in an attempt to assert their opinion on biology and gender). 
119. Jillian C. York, Policing Content in the Quasi-Public Sphere, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Sept. 
2010), https://opennet.net/policing-content-quasi-public-sphere [https://perma.cc/8SKM-L7GJ] 
(“Facebook does, however, offer a function through which users may report one another with the simple 
click of a button. The company has not spoken publicly about how this process works, but one hypothesis 
is that when a critical mass of users reports a profile, that profile is automatically disabled, possibly for 
later review by a staff member.”).  
120. Kalev Leetaru, The Problem with AI-Powered Content Moderation Is Incentives Not 
Technology, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2019, 2:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2019/03/19/t 
he-problem-with-ai-powered-content-moderation-is-incentives-not-technology/#639da14955b7 [https:/ 
/perma.cc/96RH-2HJW]. 
121. See also Gadde & Beykpour, supra note 3. 
122. See Jillian C. York, UN Report Sets Forth Strong Recommendations for Companies to 


















B. Provide Initial Warnings and Clear Explanations When a Post Is 
Removed, or a User Is Banned 
In a perfect world, there would be no need for content moderation. But 
we do not live in a perfect world; to truly foster open discussion, specific 
rules are required. Since rules are bound to be broken, social media 
companies should have detailed procedures to handle such violations. In 
conjunction with a detailed and defined set of rules for appropriate content, 
these companies should have a precise order of operations to inform users 
when a post or a profile has been suspended, removed, or terminated. 
YouTube’s copyright strike-system is one example of a relatively 
transparent process that informs users of their violations, explains the 
violations, and offers a warning for their first mistake.127 
This process should inform users immediately when a post or a profile is 
flagged or when visibility parameters are changed. Currently, this is not 
always the case, and the lack of transparency in this regard is a significant 
reason for the recent outcry against companies like Twitter.128 In late 2018, 
the Associated Press detailed Twitter’s process to maintain the “health” of 
the platform as follows: 
Twitter outlined a new approach129 intended to reduce the impact of 
disruptive users, or trolls, by reading “behavioral signals” that tend 
to indicate when users are more interested in blowing up 
conversations than in contributing. . . . While accounts flagged this 
way don’t technically violate Twitter policy, the company now wants 
to protect the “health” of users’ online conversations. (That word is 
now a staple in the company’s lexicon; CEO Jack Dorsey used 
“health,” ″healthy” or “unhealthy” 31 times in prepared 
congressional testimony Tuesday.)130 So Twitter will reduce their 
 
127. Copyright Strike Basics, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/28140 
00?hl=en [https://perma.cc/SF2P-TVRU]. 
128. See Ortutay, supra note 54. But see Sara E. Needleman, Facebook Says It Is Removing All 
Content Mentioning ‘Stop the Steal’, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fac 
ebook-says-it-is-removing-all-content-mentioning-stop-the-steal-11610401305 [https://perma.cc/3AS 
A-XXWG] (Facebook decided to remove “all content mentioning ‘stop the steal,’ a phrase popular 
among supporters of President Trump’s claims about the election, as part of a raft of emergency 
measures to stem misinformation and incitements to violents on its platform. . . .”).  
129. Del Harvey & David Gasca, Serving Healthy Conversation, TWITTER BLOG (May 15, 2018), 
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/product/2018/Serving_Healthy_Conversation.html [https: 
//perma.cc/YQL4-KMB6]. 
130. Twitter: Transparency and Accountability: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 
115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Jack Dorsey, Chief Executive Officer of Twitter, Inc.), https://docs.ho 
use.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180905/108642/HHRG-115-IF00-Wstate-DorseyJ-20180905.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/895M-EPDS]. 











visibility in certain ways, by displaying them less prominently in 
search results or conversation threads.131 
Importantly, when rolling out this policy, Twitter did not inform the 
impacted users—or at least some of the impacted users—of the changes 
made to their profile visibility.132  Restricting content and user visibility 
based on grounds outside content guidelines is not technically shadow-
banning.133 However, the increased editorialization may push social media 
companies closer to the “publisher” category than they were before.134 
Instead, companies should seek to clearly define categories such as 
“healthy” and “unhealthy” and include them in their content guidelines. 
Defined content guidelines will help social media companies make 
consistent content-moderation decisions, while also providing users more 
insight into content that may be flagged or removed.  
Next, social media companies should consider providing clear 
explanations to affected users regarding the changes to their posts or 
accounts, including the specific policy that was violated. This policy will 
reinforce objective content-moderation decisions, as it suggests that 
companies are applying rules mechanically rather than editorializing. 
Proactively citing a violated rule when issuing a warning or taking stronger 
action suggests the decision was decided objectively rather than 
subjectively—an important distinction in the “publisher v. platform” 
discussion.135  
C. Err on the Side of Caution When Deciding to Remove a User or a Post 
Platforms do not face defamation liability under the common law or 
Section 230 because they use little to no editorial discretion.136 It is true that 
Section 230 has granted some editorial discretion to companies such as 
Twitter and Facebook, though its grant is limited and targeted in nature, 
specific to offensive material. 137  To maintain a clear distinction from 
publishers, these companies should sparingly ban or hide users. Whether 
content is flagged as a result of a few unhappy users or as a result of an 
 
131. Ortutay, supra note 54.  
132. Bump, supra note 59. 
133. As previously mentioned, a user is shadow-banned when the shadow-banned user is able to 
post normally, but no other user on the platform is able to see their account or their posts. See supra Part 
II.b. 
134. See supra Part I.a. 
135. Id. As mentioned, the one key distinction between a publisher and a platform is that platforms 
do not subjectively curate their content, whereas publishers do.  
136. See Laurenson, supra note 21; see also supra Part I.a. 













outrage mob,138 social media companies should err on the side of the user 
when possible to ensure they maintain their treatment as platforms, relying 
on and communicating specific evidence when making final decisions about 
removing content or banning users.  
Evidence-based policymaking—making content-moderation decisions 
based on factual data rather than general user unrest or discontent—is a step 
in the right direction because it demonstrates an objective, rather than 
subjective, approach to content moderation.139 The less subjective content-
moderation decisions are, the less an entity looks like a publisher. 
Employing evidence-based policymaking for content moderation ensures 
that social media companies will wait to make decisions on a post or a user 
until they have determined all the necessary facts (through the help of 
researchers and experts), preventing the rash (and often incorrect) decisions 
that frequently arise during a period of social media outrage. 140  An 
additional step in prioritizing objective content-moderation decisions is to 
implement an appeals process. York and McSherry propose such a process, 
advocating that when content is flagged for violating content community 
standards, “absent exigent circumstances companies must notify the user 
and give them an opportunity to appeal before the content is taken down. If 
they choose to appeal, the content should stay up until the question is 
resolved.”141 The more precautions taken by Twitter, Facebook, and others 
before deciding to suspend or remove a user, the less they appear to be a 
publisher using editorial discretion, and the more they appear to be a 
platform merely enforcing rules objectively.  
 
138. “Outrage mobs” occur when a large number of people become angry at an individual, a 
group, or an idea and aggressively target those individuals, groups, or ideas on social media. See Erik 
Kain, Internet Mob Justice Isn’t Justice at All, FORBES (May 14, 2015, 4:51 PM), https://www.forbes.co 
m/sites/erikkain/2015/05/14/internet-mob-justice-isnt-justice-at-all/#2037e0eb616b [https://perma.cc/ 
U5GY-BMRS]; Brooke A. Rogers, We’ve Got to Stop Letting ‘Outrage Mobs’ Get People Fired, N.Y. 
POST (Aug. 5, 2018, 6:16 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/08/05/weve-got-to-stop-letting-outrage-mobs-
get-people-fired/ [https://perma.cc/Q4TY-RYMD]; Mark Molloy, Online Shaming: The Dangerous 
Rise of the Internet Pitchfork Mob, TEL. (June 25, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/20 
18/06/25/online-shaming-dangerous-rise-internet-pitchfork-mob/. “Outrage mobs” are often considered 
a part of the broader “cancel culture” as well. See Brooke Kato, What is Cancel Culture? Everything To 
Know About the Toxic Online Trend, N.Y. POST (July 10, 2020, 4:44 PM), https://nypost.com/article/wh 
at-is-cancel-culture-breaking-down-the-toxic-online-trend/ [https://perma.cc/CX6K-KAQJ] (describing 
“cancel culture” as “the phenomenon of promoting the ‘canceling’ of people, brands and even shows 
and movies due to what some consider to be offensive or problematic remarks or ideologies”). 
139. See York & McSherry, supra note 116 (encouraging social media entities to utilize experts 
and researchers when making content-moderation decisions). 
140. See id. 
141. Id.  











VI. LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO ENSURE TRANSPARENCY IN CONTENT 
MODERATION 
The internet in 2020 is vastly different from the internet in 1996.142 When 
Section 230 was initially passed nearly twenty-five years ago, the internet 
was in its infancy, and many websites were simply “digital versions of real-
world things.”143 As the internet expanded, business models changed to 
create a more personalized experience for each user.144 To foster further 
engagement with users, “internet companies began ‘personalizing’ their 
sites so that each user would have a different and unique experience” that 
was crafted to specifically engage that user.145 “Websites became highly 
curated experiences served up by algorithms” that used the user’s browsing 
history and personal data to create this custom experience.146 
Section 230 protects internet providers from defamation liability for “any 
action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of 
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or 
not such material is constitutionally protected . . . .”147 This provision is 
critical because without it, social media companies would be treated like 
platforms in the truest sense, liable for any curation of their content.148 If 
not for this provision, social media companies would be incentivized to 
allow any and all content on their platform so as to avoid defamation 
liability.149 With the evolution of internet platforms, it is time to revisit 
Section 230 to ensure we are honoring the intent of the legislation and to 
confirm that social media companies are not capitalizing on what has been 
called an “outdated loophole.”150  
It is difficult to say that lawmakers could have predicted the creation of 
social media when passing this legislation—much less its explosive growth 
 
142. Reuben Fischer-Baum, What ‘Tech World’ Did You Grow Up In?, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/entertainment/tech-generations/ [https://perma. 
cc/FL3G-EATS] (comparing year-over-year statistics on internet usage and consumption of digital 
media).  
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in recent years. However, we do have an indication of their intent for Section 
230 and the CDA. In its preamble, Section 230 states:  
The Congress finds the following: 
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive 
computer services available to individual Americans represent an 
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and 
informational resources to our citizens. 
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the 
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater 
control in the future as technology develops. 
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum 
for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for 
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity. 
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have 
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of 
government regulation. 
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a 
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment 
services.151 
It is clear from the preamble that the lawmakers anticipated, to some 
degree, the significant role that the internet would play in the American 
discourse. It also appears clear that they sought to allow the internet to grow 
naturally, with minimal government intrusion.152 What may not have been 
clear is just how pivotal social media would become; today, social media 
executives wield power that potentially shapes public discourse. Though 
some of the solutions may be internal to the companies themselves,153 the 
immense importance of social media for political and social discourse in the 
United States requires legal solutions as well. 
A. A Non-Partisan Government Watchdog Should Be Employed to 
Evaluate Potential Disparate Impact in Content Moderation 
Senator Hawley’s proposed legislation requires that social media 
companies submit themselves to an FTC audit and clearly demonstrate that 
they are politically neutral in order to earn immunity.154 However, complete 
 
151. § 230(a) (emphasis added).  
152. See § 230(b)(2) (explaining “[i]t is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the vibrant 
and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation”); cf. BRANNON, supra note 42, at 4. 
153. See supra Part V.  
154. Senator Hawley Introduces Legislation to Amend Section 230 Immunity for Big Tech 
Companies, supra note 89.  











neutrality is not a reasonable expectation given the volume of users and 
posts,155 and the current inability to effectively moderate content completely 
using algorithms.156 Furthermore, political leaders on both sides of the aisle 
may be wary of enacting any sort of restriction or limitation on the private 
companies operating these social media sites.157  However, an oversight 
committee charged with reviewing and rating algorithms and content-
moderation practices of social media companies may be a useful measure. 
As mentioned, a majority of Americans believe that social media companies 
engage in political censorship. 158  Requiring online platforms with a 
particular user volume (like the “Big Tech”159 social media companies, for 
example) to submit to a review and rating by a non-partisan oversight group 
may help both to encourage social media entities –potentially including 
web-hosting services such Amazon Web Services (AWS)160 –to minimize 
biased editorial discretion and to make transparent the facts about whether 
a bias exists.161 The goal of this proposal is not to require neutrality, but to 
provide consumers with information on how each company handles 
politically or culturally sensitive issues. As mentioned, the factual basis for 
intentional “shadow-banning” is sparse, 162  though public-opinion data 
 
155. “Facebook, the largest social media platform in the world, has 2.4 billion users. Other social 
media platforms including Youtube and Whatsapp also have more than one billion users each.” Esteban 
Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise of Social Media, OUR WORLD IN DATA (September 18, 2019), https://ourworldin 
data.org/rise-of-social-media [https://perma.cc/2GZT-G75C]. With this volume of users, it is 
impractical to expect complete neutrality without an upheaval of the current business model, though it 
is reasonable to expect social media entities to apply content moderation rules and technologies in a 
consistent and generally fair manner.  
156. See Megan Rose Dickey, Unbiased Algorithms Can Still Be Problematic, TECHCRUNCH 
(Sept. 30, 2018, 3:45 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/09/30/unbiased-algorithms-can-still-be-proble 
matic/ [https://perma.cc/7LC5-5DWK]. 
157. John Morris, who handled internet policy issues at the Commerce Department’s National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, said “[a]lthough the government may be able to 
support and assist online platforms’ efforts to reduce hate and violence online, the government should 
not try to impose speech regulations on private platforms. As politicians from both sides of the political 
spectrum have historically urged, the government should not be in the business of regulating speech.” 
Margaret Harding McGill & Daniel Lippman, White House Drafting Executive Order to Tackle Silicon 
Valley’s Alleged Anti-Conservative Bias, POLITICO (Aug. 7, 2019, 3:07 PM), https://www.politico.com/ 
story/2019/08/07/white-house-tech-censorship-1639051 [https://perma.cc/N7W9-GVPK]. 
158. Roughly Seven-in-Ten Americans Think It Likely That Social Media Platforms Censor 
Political Viewpoints, supra note 60.  
159. BRANNON, supra note 46, at 3. 
160. Following the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021, Parler, a social-media platform 
largely viewed as politically conservative, was removed on both the Apple and Google app stores. 
Furthermore, Amazon banned Parler from its web-hosting service AWS because Amazon “ wasn’t 
confident in [Parler’s] ability to sufficiently police content on its platform that incites violence.” See 
Keach Hagey, Parler Sues Amazon After Tech Giant Kicks Site Off Its Servers, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 
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suggests the broader population seems to believe it is happening. 163 
Amending Section 230 to include a required review by a non-partisan 
government agency provides a minimally intrusive solution that may 
incentivize consistent content-moderation practices and also provide clarity 
about content-moderation processes for users.  
B. An Executive Order Requiring Social Media Companies to Limit 
Content Moderation to the Precise Language in Section 230 
An alternative to formally amending Section 230 is to issue an executive 
order reinforcing the original language of Section 230. The idea of issuing 
an executive order to reaffirm an existing law is not new—President Trump 
issued an executive order that reinforced universities’ requirement to 
promote free speech on their campuses in order to receive federal research 
funding.164 President Obama similarly used an executive order expand upon 
an executive order165  enacted by President Lyndon Johnson to prohibit 
“federal contractors from discriminating against workers on the basis of 
sexual orientation or gender identity.”166 While an executive order would 
not fully address the issue, it would serve as an effective intermediary while 
legislators, regulators, and company executives continue to determine the 
future of Section 230 and the liability of social media companies for user 
content.167  The White House began to discuss this idea after the initial 
reports of shadow-banning. 168  In a proposed executive order entitled 
“Protecting Americans from Online Censorship,” the White House seeks to 
empower the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to monitor the 
content-moderation policies of social media entitles, similar to Senator 
Hawley’s proposed legislation.169 The proposed order primarily takes aim 
at the good-faith provision of Section 230,170 enabling the FCC to take a 
more restrictive view of the provision, which has given broad immunity to 
social media platforms and allowed them to curate content mostly 
 
163. Cf. Roughly Seven-in-Ten Americans Think It Likely That Social Media Platforms Censor 
Political Viewpoints, supra note 60. 
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165. Exec. Order No. 11, 246 (1965), 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964–1965).  
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unquestioned.171 Most recently, at the direction of the White House, the 
Commerce Department filed a petition with the FCC encouraging the FCC 
to “use its authorities to clarify ambiguities in Section 230 so as to make its 
interpretation appropriate to the current internet marketplace and provide 
clearer guidance to courts, platforms, and users.” 172  Ultimately, this 
approach will serve merely as a stop-gap until the legislature determines a 
further course of action. 
CONCLUSION
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act laid a foundation for 
the internet to develop by offering defamation liability protections to 
interactive computer services for the actions of third-party users. This 
protection, provided exclusively for online platforms, allowed the internet 
to flourish and opened the door for social media companies like Twitter and 
Facebook. Concerns over the content-moderation practices—such as 
shadow-banning—of such companies have given rise to new discussions 
about whether such liability protection should continue to apply given the 
power that social media companies have over information. To ensure that 
they maintain their protections, social media companies should follow a 
three-step process to restructure their content-moderation practices by 
articulating clear rules and guidelines, communicating all potential 
violations to users, and considering all other avenues before deciding to 
remove a post or ban a user. This will produce an objective content-
moderation system, in line with the spirit of Section 230. Furthermore, 
Congress should revisit and update Section 230 to reflect the current internet 
age and ensure that social media companies are not exploiting the wide 
latitude they have been granted. Solutions, such as employing a non-partisan 
oversight group to analyze and publicize content-moderation practices of 
social media companies, will incentivize social media companies to act 
objectively in their content-moderation practices without requiring 
complete neutrality. These solutions will also inform users about how social 
 
171. See Fung, supra note 167 (“Under [President Trump’s] draft proposal, the FCC will be asked 
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